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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEFORE THE HONORABLE VAUGHN R. WALKER

IN RE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

)MDL 06-1791 VRW

TELECOMMUNICATIONS RECORDS

)Related Case C 07-0109 VRW

LITIGATION

)Related Case C 0672 VRW

)Friday

)September 12, 2008

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiffs: EISENBERG & HANCOCK

1970 Broadway Suite 1200

Oakland, California 94612

BY: JON B. EISENBERG, ESQ.

ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION

454 Shotwell Street San Francisco, CA 94110

BY: CINDY COHN, ESQ. KURT OPSAHL, ESQ.

MOTLEY RICE, LLP

28 Bridgeside Boulevard

PO Box 1792

Mr. Pleasant, South Carolina 29464

BY: VINCENT PARRETT, ESQ

(APPEARANCES CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE)

Reported By: Debra L. Pas, CSR 11916, CRR, RMR, RPR

Official Reporter - US District Court Computerized Transcription By Eclipse

1	APPEARANCES: (CONTI	NUED)
2		
3	For Plaintiffs:	AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION Foundation of Northern California, Inc.
4	מ	39 Drumm Street San Francisco, California 94111 Y: ANN BRICK, ESQ.
5		I. ANN BRICK, ESQ.
6		STATE OF MISSOURI
7		Public Service Commission 200 Madison Street
8		PO Box 360 Jefferson City, Missouri 65102
9	В	Y: PEGGY ANN WHIPPLE, ESQ.
10		
11		LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN
12		275 Battery Street, 30th Floor San Francisco, California 94111
13	В	Y: BARRY R. HIMMELSTEIN, ESQ.
14		
15	For Intervenor:	THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROJECT
16	ror intervenor.	1736 Franklin Street 9th Floor
17	מ	Oakland, California 94612 Y: JAMES R. WHEATON, ESQ.
18	ь	i: DAMES R. WHEATON, ESQ.
19	Ton Defendents.	
20	For Defendants:	UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division
21		20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Room 6102
22	В	Washington, DC 20530 Y: ANTHONY J. COPPOLINO, ESQ.
23		
24	(APPEARANC	ES CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGE)
25		

1	APPEARANCES: (CON	TINUE	D)
2			
3	For Defendants:		PILLSBURY WINTHROP LLP
4			50 Fremont Street Post Office Box 7880
5		BY:	San Francisco, California 94120-7880 BRUCE A. ERICSON, ESQ.
6			
7			SIDLEY AUSTIN, LLP
8			1501 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20005
9		BY:	BRADFORD A. BERENSON, ESQ.
10			
11			MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON, LLP 355 S. Grand Avenue
12			35th Floor Los Angeles, California 90071
13		BY:	HENRY WEISSMANN, ESQ.
14			
15			WILMER, CUTLER, PICKERING, HALE & DORR 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
16		BY•	Washington, DC 20006 SAMIR JAIN, ESQ.
17		D1 •	SIMIL SILIN, EDQ.
18			WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY
19			725 12th Street, NW Washington, DC 20005
20		BY:	JOHN G. KESTER, ESQ.
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	SEPTEMBER 12, 2008 11:12 a.m.
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4	THE CLERK: Calling MDL 06-1791, In Re NSA
5	Telecommunications Records Litigation, and this relates to
6	Civil 07-109, Al Haramain versus George Bush.
7	THE COURT: Never heard so many silent lawyers in my
8	life. You want to enter an appearance?
9	MR. EISENBERG: Jon Eisenberg for Al Haramain, Belew
10	and Ghafoor.
11	THE COURT: All right. That's how you do it.
12	MR. COPPOLINO: Your Honor, Anthony Coppolino,
13	Department of Justice, for the United States.
14	THE COURT: Welcome back.
15	MR. EISENBERG: Thank you, your Honor.
16	THE COURT: We are here basically to set a schedule
17	in Al Haramain and in the other cases.
18	Let me tell you what I have in mind. I think it
19	would expedite matters in this case to have both the motions
20	which the parties contemplate from Al Haramain, to have the
21	government file its motion to dismiss or its summary judgment
22	motion, however it wishes to characterize that motion, on or
23	before September 30.
24	The plaintiffs to file its motion for discovery under
25	Section 1806(f) on the same date, September 30.

1	Then the parties to file their respective opposition
2	to the other party's motions on October 23.
3	Reply memoranda on November 13.
4	And we will set the matter down for hearing on
5	December 2nd. We can do that either in the morning or
6	afternoon depending upon what your preference is.
7	How does that schedule sound? Mr. Eisenberg?
8	MR. EISENBERG: That's fine with us, your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Mr. Coppolino?
10	MR. COPPOLINO: You say December the 2nd, your Honor?
11	THE COURT: Yes.
12	MR. COPPOLINO: That's a Tuesday, not your normal
13	THE COURT: For you, Mr. Coppolino and Mr. Eisenberg,
14	a special setting.
15	MR. EISENBERG: I thank you for that, your Honor.
16	THE COURT: What's that?
17	MR. EISENBERG: I thank you for that, your Honor.
18	MR. COPPOLINO: And morning would be preferable, if
19	it please the Court, your Honor.
20	THE COURT: Why don't we do it at 10:00 o'clock?
21	MR. COPPOLINO: I guess, your Honor, I would just
22	ask the obviously, we had set forth our views as to why
23	their motion shouldn't be filed at this point, and I don't want
24	to spend time on that since you appear to have decided
25	THE COURT: Well, I have read the statements and I

understand your position, but I think in this case, that is the Al Haramain case, I think you both can present your respective 2 3 positions and your oppositions. 4 And, obviously, if you persuade me on the motion to 5 dismiss or summary judgment, we may never reach the 1806 6 issues. That may be a complete disposition of the matter, 7 but --MR. COPPOLINO: If I could just clarify one thing. 8 9 THE COURT: In the event that motion is denied, I want to hear your position and what plaintiff's position is 10 11 with respect to it. 12 MR. COPPOLINO: Is your Honor expecting that in our -- we could certainly set fourth our views in opposition to 13 14 their views. That's not a problem. But I would not contemplate actually commencing the 15 16 1806(f) proceedings in response to their motion, since in our 17 view that requires resolution of a number of threshold issues and would require an Attorney General certification or 18 19 affidavit to trigger 1806(f). If that's off the table, then we 2.0 would just be presenting our issues and arguments. 21 THE COURT: You will have to respond to Mr. 22 Eisenberg's memorandum as it's -- and position as its filed. 23 MR. COPPOLINO: Thank you, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: All right? 25 In terms of page limits, 30 pages on the opening

briefs, 30 pages on the oppositions, 15 pages on the reply. 2 If we want more pages, I know that you are a position to furnish them. 3 4 MR. EISENBERG: Your Honor, for our 1806 motion, the 5 page limits are more than adequate. I anticipate needing about 6 22 to 25 pages. 7 THE COURT: Oh, that's fine. MR. EISENBERG: I will give you less than you are 8 9 allowing us, if you wish. 10 I would like to just briefly raise the issue of 11 classified filings by the government. We have seen a lot of them in the past and I think we would benefit from some 12 13 guidance by some -- benefit from guidance by the Court as to whether or not they would be appropriate now, because if there 14 15 are classified filings in Mr. Coppolino's motion, we would like 16 somehow the opportunity to respond to them in a secure manner. 17 Now, I don't know if Mr. Coppolino has in mind 18 further classified filings, so perhaps I need to turn -- turn 19 it over to him. 2.0 MR. COPPOLINO: Well, I suppose, your Honor, my short 21 answer would be, they can see what we file and respond to it in 22 opposition to our motion, because I'm not prepared to in any 23 way concede that we would not present the evidence we need, we 24 think that the Court needs to see, including ex parte in 25 camera, in order to decide the questions before it.

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And, certainly, for example, if an Attorney General authored certification is warranted, that, undoubtedly, would be classified ex parte in camera; but in addition to that, the purpose of their motion -- the purpose of the first question to be decided, to decide whether they are aggrieved, to decide whether that is established.

If we have facts and information which is classified that can only be presented ex parte in camera, in order to demonstrate to you the actual facts may differ or for other reasons than what they aver in their complaint and we do that on summary judgment, I think we would have the right to do that. Otherwise, you would be asked to adjudicate a question as to whether standing is established without access to the facts.

We have to recognize, as I think the Court does, that this is a proceeding that involves allegations of classified foreign intelligence surveillance activities and this is not about -- the objective of establishing standing is whether, in fact, they have standing.

And if they are going to aver something on the public record, as they have on their complaint, that they contend proves by inference that they have standing and the actual facts are clearly to the contrary, but remain classified, I think we would have the right and opportunity to present those.

Now, whether you consider -- I don't think that

forecloses you from considering any argument they would make as a matter of law as to whether you ought to consider that. We certainly would object at any point to their having access to that information.

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THE COURT: Well, let me tell you what has been my reaction to the filings in these cases here before. And that has been that the classified materials that I have viewed in connection with the state secrets issues that have been litigated here, frankly, have not been very helpful in resolving the issues that I have had to resolve.

And, consequently, I have come to the conclusion that what I should do, if at all possible, is to address the issues that are raised without resort to any classified information, if I can.

So I think it behooves you, Mr. Coppolino, to be sparing in your submission of such materials. Obviously, sparing because of the sensitivity of those materials, but, also, because it may very well be that resort to that information is simply not necessary in order for you to present your position. And you might very well -- and I'm not telling you how to litigate your position, but you might very well take the position that you don't think it's necessary to file anything that's classified for purposes of the motions that we are going to hear, but you reserve the right to do so at some later time if the case proceeds.

1	So I don't want to stop you and I'm not going to
2	direct that you cannot file those kinds of materials, but bear
3	in mind I haven't been very helped by them in the past.
4	MR. COPPOLINO: Thank you, your Honor.
5	THE COURT: Okay.
6	MR. EISENBERG: If I can only add, your Honor, we
7	believe the issue here is whether or not we made a sufficient
8	showing based on unclassified information.
9	THE COURT: That does seem to be the issue.
10	MR. EISENBERG: That is the issue, and I don't see
11	how classified information could possibly have anything to do
12	with that determination.
13	So with that, I will thank you.
14	THE COURT: Very well.
15	Now, can we turn to the telecommunications cases.
16	MS. COHN: Good morning, your Honor. Cindy Cohn on
17	behalf of the MDL plaintiffs in the Hepting case.
18	THE COURT: Good morning, Miss Cohn.
19	MR. PARRETT: Good morning, your Honor. Vince
20	Parrett of Motley Rice for the Verizon customer plaintiffs.
21	THE COURT: Good morning.
22	MR. OPSAHL: Good morning. Kurt Opsahl, Electronic
23	Frontier Foundation, for the MDL plaintiffs.
24	MS. BRICK: Good morning, your Honor. Ann Brick,
25	ACLU of Northern California on behalf of plaintiff.

1	MS. WHIPPLE: Good morning, your Honor. Peggy
2	Whipple on behalf of only one of the two Missouri cases pending
3	before you, Clayton versus AT&T Communications, in which I am
4	plaintiff's counsel.
5	THE COURT: Very well.
6	MR. HIMMELSTEIN: Good morning, your Honor. Barry
7	Himmelstein from Lief, Cabraser, Heimann and Bernstein for the
8	MCI class plaintiffs.
9	MR. WHEATON: Your Honor, James Wheaton for First
10	Amendment Project on behalf of the potential intervenor Media
11	Alliance. I was asked this morning to appear and to discuss
12	procedures for that intervention.
13	THE COURT: Very well, Mr. Wheaton, good morning.
14	MR. WHEATON: Thank you.
15	THE COURT: Just a moment please.
16	(Brief pause.)
17	THE COURT: All right.
18	MR. COPPOLINO: Your Honor, Anthony Coppolino, again
19	for the United States.
20	MR. ERICSON: Bruce Ericson for the AT&T defendants.
21	MR. BERENSON: Brad Berenson, Sidley Austin LLP, for
22	the AT&T Cingular and Bell South defendants, your Honor.
23	MR. WEISSMANN: Good morning, your Honor. Henry
24	Weissmann of the Munger Tolls firm for the Verizon defendants.
25	MR. JAIN: Samir Jain at Wilmer Hale also for the

Verizon and MCI defendants.

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MR. KESTER: Good morning, your Honor. John Kester, Williams and Connolly, for Sprint Nextel. And I would like to introduce my partner, Gilbert Greenman, also representing Sprint Nextel.

THE COURT: Very well. Anybody else?

MS. COHN: Your Honor, if I may. I wanted to let you know right away that we have in preparing for the immunity issues to come up really come to the conclusion -- this is not reflected in the CMC statement, which is why I raise it now, that it would be useful and I think proprietary to combine the cases against AT&T into a consolidated complaint for those purposes.

Otherwise, I worry that we are going to end up with some tag-along issues or some -- you know, the cases raise a variety of claims in a variety of different ways. And I think if we pull them all together into one complaint, the fight about the immunity and its effect on the cases will be a lot cleaner and easier for everyone.

I have a proposed schedule that adjusts things a little bit in order to give us the time to do that. There are 23 cases against the AT&T defendants that would need to be combined. Then it may make sense to also take Cingular and Bell South in at that time, although I haven't finished my thinking on that now that they are all owned by AT&T, but I

thought I would present a slightly revised schedule to reflect 2 that. 3 (Whereupon, document was tendered 4 to the Court.) 5 MS. COHN: I'm sorry to interrupt, and I know that 6 you probably have some thoughts, but since this is different 7 than what was in the case management statement, I wanted to bring it to your attention right away. 8 9 MR. BERENSON: Your Honor, Brad Berenson for the AT&T defendants. 10 11 We believe that the preparation and filing of a consolidated complaint against AT&T is entirely unnecessary in 12 13 order for the Court to evaluate the immunity issues and will just be a source of needless extra delay in a schedule that 14 15 everyone seems to agree should move forward expeditiously. 16 There are 23 complaints against the AT&T defendants. 17 As I understand it, the government is ready to file 18 certification and a motion with respect to those 23 complaints. 19 And all of the normal purposes that would be served by having a 2.0 consolidated complaint are utterly beside the point here, where 2.1 we are ready, willing and able to deal with the 23 complaints 22 individually. 23 So I would ask that leave not be granted to --24 THE COURT: Let me ask you, Mr. Berenson, what role 25 do you think you and your colleagues representing the other

telecommunications carriers have in this? Isn't this really a motion to be brought by the government and only by the 2 3 government? 4 MR. BERENSON: It absolutely is, your Honor. not contemplate filing any motion of our own. The Attorney 5 6 General will file a certification, if appropriate, presumably 7 accompanied by some motion to dismiss. And our role will be that specified for the parties 8 9 in the FISA Amendments Act itself, which is to brief whatever legal issues arise out of that filing in order to be of some 10 11 assistance to the Court. That's really it. THE COURT: I see. More briefs. 12 13 MR. BERENSON: That's what Congress has asked for, 14 your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 16 Mr. Coppolino? 17 MR. COPPOLINO: The only point I would make on this issue of the amended complaint, your Honor, without getting 18 19 into the larger issues that we have to address today is that as 2.0 Mr. Berenson pointed out, the Attorney General certification is 2.1 going to cover all of the actions that have been brought 22 against electronic communication service providers, including 23 the individual actions, including all the AT&T actions that 24 would be consolidated. And so there is no need to do that in order to make 25

the certification and -- nor, in our view, should we have to wait to do that to -- should we have to wait for another consolidated complaint reiterating the same allegations of assistance that are going to be at issue in the Attorney General's certification in order to make that -- in order to make that certification.

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So I think the request is unnecessary because the cases are already before the Court and they are cases as to which the certification will be directed, and we certainly would oppose it to the extent that it results in any delay.

But we can talk about the larger issues in dispute between the parties as to how we proceed on that score when it pleases the Court.

THE COURT: Well, it pleases the Court right now.

MR. COPPOLINO: Well, I think, your Honor, if you -I know you have had an opportunity to study our case management
proceedings and the fundamental issue I think that's in dispute
is whether the government gets to file the motion that you just
mentioned to Mr. Berenson; that we have, in our view, the right
to file under the new FIZA Act amendments of 2008, along with
the Attorney General certifications. And it is -- it is one in
the same.

And our view -- when this statute was enacted or was getting near enactment, I called Ms. Cohn -- or, actually, her colleague Mr. Tien, who is on leave, I guess. I said, Congress

is about to pass this. We are obviously going to seek to 2 implement it at some point. Let's talk about a schedule. 3 And at that point the plaintiffs came back and said, 4 We don't want you to file your motion. We oppose your filing 5 your motion. And we are going to interpose a whole bunch of 6 objections to the act before you do so. 7 And I responded in different ways, but I think the thrust of my response was, You can make any arguments you want 8 in opposition to our motion. Arguing, for example, that the statute is unconstitutional. We have seen a lot in the 10 11 blogosphere about that. Arguing that there are questions of law to be considered, as the Court considers our motion. 12 13 But we will, of course, file our motion and you can then respond to it as the normal course is, as I think you just 14 15 indicated, was the course we would follow in Al Haramain. 16 All of plaintiffs' arguments that they foreshadowed 17 in the case management statement, all of them are classic 18 opposition arguments, or cross motion arguments, but there is 19 nothing --2.0 THE COURT: You could hardly blame the plaintiffs for 21 that, Mr. Coppolino. 22 MR. COPPOLINO: Excuse me, your Honor? 23 THE COURT: You could hardly blame the plaintiffs for 24 that. 25 MR. COPPOLINO: No, but the point is, they are

opposition arguments. Nothing would require you to bar us from 2 filing our motion to begin with. And I would add further that I don't believe they can 3 4 challenge any action that's taken until it is taken. There is 5 a fundamental right --6 THE COURT: Perhaps I should hear from Miss Cohn on 7 this point. After all, it does seem to me that on behalf of the 8 9 government, you are entitled under the FISA amendments to proceed with the motion that you are contemplating. And it's 10 11 really Miss Cohn who has the uphill climb here and I should give her the floor to tell me why what she is proposing, that I 12 13 must say does not appear to be in sync with the FISA amendments, is the appropriate way to proceed. 14 15 MS. COHN: Sure, your Honor. 16 I think that, you know, the Court retains the plenary 17 authority to decide how cases should proceed and which motions should come when. 18 I have certainly been in many meetings with a Court 19 2.0 where a judge has said, You know, it's too early for your 21 summary judgment motion, counsel. Go off and do some discovery 22 and come back, or you can do this motion now. So I think under the rubric of your ability to kind 23 24 of control the reasonable process of this case as it goes

forward, you have the authority to decide which motions come

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first, including the government's motion. I don't think there is anything in the Congressional action that requires you to 2 3 set aside your ability to control the ordinarily -- ordinary 4 process of the case in front of its Court. 5 THE COURT: Well, that's certainly true. 6 statute, however, is an unusual statute. 7 MS. COHN: Absolutely. It appears to contemplate a procedure 8 THE COURT: 9 more or less along the lines of that which the government has outlined in its portion of the case management conference. 10 MS. COHN: Well, your Honor, I think that -- that 11 there are real important reasons why you should let the parties 12 take a stab at presenting the constitutional and, almost as 13 importantly, the statutory interpretation questions first. 14 15 First of all, I think it's a matter of -- simply as a matter of judicial economy, if this statute is unconstitutional 16 17 as a threshold matter, which is what we believe it is, then we don't need to reach a lot of complicated questions about how 18 19 actually to apply it. THE COURT: Well, the problem I had with your 2.0 21 position is you don't ordinarily challenge the 22 constitutionality of a statute until you know that the statute 23 applies, and you might in your opposition be able to persuade 24 me that the statute does not apply to one or some other aspect

of this case, in which case we wouldn't have to reach the

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constitutionality issue. 2 MS. COHN: That's right, your Honor, but I think that 3 -- I don't think there is any question that the government is 4 going to apply the statute. Mr. Coppolino has said as much 5 here and he said it in papers and he said it in correspondence 6 with me. 7 So if there was a question about whether the government was going to exercise its discretion to invoke the 8 9 statute, then there may be something, but I don't think that there is any --10 THE COURT: Well, there is a substantial evidence 11 12 standard which the government has to meet --That's right. 13 MS. COHN: THE COURT: -- under this statute. 14 You may be able to persuade me that that government 15 has not met that substantial evidence threshold, in which case 16 17 we wouldn't have to reach the constitutionality issue. MS. COHN: And that runs smack into the first, I 18 19 think, two real issues of statutory interpretation that we need 2.0 to sort out before we get into the matter of applying the 2.1 statute. 22 They have a substantial evidence standard that they 23 have to meet. That's a burden of proof, an evidentiary burden 24 of proof. 25 So I think that under the basic rules, this is

essentially -- this is a summary judgment motion that they are going to be bringing. It doesn't qualify as a motion to dismiss.

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The statute itself says the government is either going to bring a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, but I think under the settled rules this is an evidentiary motion. It's a motion for summary judgment.

Well, ordinarily in the context of a motion for summary judgment the parties get to present evidence on both sides, and we get to present our evidence. The question about the Klein evidence and the Marcus evidence that's already in the record in this case about the nature of the surveillance that we allege is going on in the AT&T facility on Folsom Street, the raft of Congressional admissions about the surveillance that has been going on now for seven years.

The, actually, governmental admissions, many of which have happened in the last couple of years that we brought in front of the Ninth Circuit and can bring again in here.

Those are all pieces of evidence that we would like to put forward that we already have to demonstrate that they haven't met their burden of substantial evidence to show that this was designed to stop a terrorist attacking of the United States, which is their burden. That dragnet surveillance of millions of ordinary Americans is not designed to prevent terrorist attacks against the United States. So we want to put

in the evidence that we already have.

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As far as I can tell from the papers, although the government has been a little cagey about this, they do not believe that you are entitled to look at this evidence and -- and so we are going to have a fight about that.

Secondarily, in the context of a motion for summary judgment situation or leading into one, the parties ordinarily get a chance to do discovery so that we can develop additional evidence in support of what we -- in addition to what we already have and put that in front of the Court to say they have not met their burden of substantial evidence.

But the government is envisioning a situation that turns that on its head; that they get to move to get rid of our case before we get the opportunity to try to develop and present evidence about why it is they haven't met their burden.

THE COURT: How can I read this statute and come to a conclusion that if the government is able to meet the requirements of the statute, that Congress intended for this statute to bar all of the cases against the telecommunications carriers. And in light of that kind of statutory provision how can I faithfully, with the provisions of the statute, do anything other than to address that issue first?

MS. COHN: Well, your Honor, I think that the statute doesn't say that without any evidence or any input from the plaintiffs you have to decide whether -- they would have to --

1 THE COURT: We are not contemplating an ex parte proceeding. 2 3 MS. COHN: Well, I believe actually that the 4 government effectively is in terms of evidence, and this is the 5 I mean, this is what I want to sort out. 6 We think that they are -- we should be allowed -- and 7 there is nothing about this statute that prevents us, as far as we can tell, from presenting the evidence we already have or 8 from gathering additional evidence using the ordinary Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Section 26. 10 11 If Congress had wanted to prevent us from having any ability to gather additional information in order to 12 13 demonstrate that the government hasn't met its evidentiary burden, they know how to turn off discovery. 14 15 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, for instance, has limitations on discovery where Congress has 16 17 clearly laid that out. There is nothing like that in the FISA Amendments Act. 18 19 So unless Congress prevents us from having the 2.0 ability and the normal tools in a normal to gather evidence in 21 support of our position, we get those rights. 22 There is nothing in the statute that says Federal 23 Rule of Civil Procedure Section 26 doesn't apply or in any way 24 limits our ability to conduct this like we'd conduct a normal

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case.

1 We have a burden here that's an evidentiary burden 2 and I think it's --3 THE COURT: This is a brand new statute. 4 MS. COHN: It is. 5 THE COURT: Brand new. Hot off the government 6 printing office press. 7 MS. COHN: I wouldn't argue. That is true. THE COURT: And there are clearly legal issues 8 9 associated with that statute, and the full implications of it have certainly not been tested. 10 And under those circumstances why isn't the sensible 11 course of action to tee up what appear to be the dispositive 12 provisions of that statute and see whether or not they apply to 13 this case. 14 15 Well, your Honor, I think that it would be MS. COHN: pretty unfair to tie both our hands behind our back and make us 16 17 go through that process, by not being able to present evidence and not being able to develop additional evidence and then see 18 if we can fight their substantial evidence presentation. 19 THE COURT: The provisions of the statute don't 2.0 2.1 contemplate an evidentiary hearing at this threshold stage. 22 Well, I think that they do, your Honor. MS. COHN: 23 How else are we going to know whether they've made substantial 24 evidence? They have got an evidentiary burden. 25 Presumably, I think it's not crazy to think that our

burden is to present evidence to you showing that they haven't made their burden, and so --

THE COURT: But there is nothing that prevents you from trying to make that showing.

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MS. COHN: Well, if we don't get discovery, then I'm stuck with just what I have so far, which I'm not saying is insubstantial, but I don't think it's fair to prevent us from trying to gather more.

Basically to have to oppose their substantial evidence presentation without the opportunity to develop the evidence we need to counter it seems to be pretty unfair.

There is another reason as well why I don't think we should run head-long into this, and that is -- those are some of the issues that you referenced earlier, which is the secrecy issues and the due process concerns with the secret evidence.

This certification process and motion process is set up in a way where the Attorney General can trigger absolute secrecy if they want to. You have -- takes away any discretion that you have about the secrecy. It also actually requires you to issue a secret order, a largely secret order without -- you know, it's one thing for the Court to have discretion to decide to keep things secret. That's not what this statute does.

This statute gives to the Attorney General the right to demand that you have keep things secret, which, again, I think is a part of why we think the statute is

unconstitutional.

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And we'd certainly like the opportunity to present to you why we think that part of the statute at a minimum should not be enforced and that you should be empowered to decide whether there are pieces of what the government has told you under this provision that have no real basis for being kept secret from the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: What I don't understand is why you can't make all of these arguments in opposition to the motion?

MS. COHN: Well, I can, your Honor, but we are going to end up in a situation with an extremely complicated brief that I think will be hard for us and, certainly, I think will be hard for the Court. Because I'm going to have to say, Well, your Honor, if you get to consider the Klein and Marcus evidence -- here is all the reasons you should consider the Klein and Marcus evidence and if you decide that you agree with me that you can consider the Klein and Marcus evidence, here is my arguments against it.

Now, if you decide that you can't consider -- the government is going to take the position, I suspect, that you don't get to consider any evidence outside of what they give you. So then I'm going to have to also back up and say, Well, actually, if you don't get to consider Klein and Marcus, here is all the reasons why we think that's a problem. And, by the way, that's another reason why the whole thing is

unconstitutional because it sets up a system that really deprives us of due process here.

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I'm going to have to do the same thing about every piece of evidence and then I'm going to have to write you a section about all the other discovery that I would do if I had the opportunity to do so and what I think that might do. And you are going to have, you know, a kind of big if-then brief, which is going to be a lot longer than if the parties all know what the rules are before we brief this.

If I know I don't have to brief whether you get to look at Klein and Marcus and you don't have to sort that out, you can decide that first and then you will get clean briefs on just the issues that we -- you know, you had determined are relevant to the discussion.

I think that's the right way to go. It has this extra benefit that I think is tremendously important, which is that the Court doesn't have to look at the classified -- at the secret filings under our ruling until after it's decided that the statute actually is constitutional and should apply.

I think your Honor has been careful throughout this litigation to try to limit the amount of secret evidence that is presented and in this instance a secret ruling that is going to be issued.

If you go the way that we are doing it, we can have a bunch of threshold issues that can be completely on the record.

There is no secret evidence needed for our arguments and I suspect not many for -- not for the government's responses 2 3 either because it's about the legality of the statute, 4 separation of powers questions and due process questions. 5 And we can have this part of the fight in the open, 6 as opposed to having to have a situation where there are a lot 7 of classified information -- not classified, but information that the Attorney General has ordered to be kept secret from; 8 the parties, that the Court has to weed through and base its decision on. 10 11 So I think that the due process problems are worrisome here and that the course that we have charted is one 12 13 that would really leave the secrecy questions for the second round and once we all have clarity on what the statute means 14 15 and whether it survives constitutional muster. THE COURT: You think one round of motions like that 16 17 is going to provide clarity? MS. COHN: Well, your Honor, I think you have been 18 pretty good at giving us really clear rules. Sometimes I agree 19 with them, sometimes I don't. But I think that it will really 2.0 21 help focus the questions. 22 This is a new statute. It has a lot of -- there is 23 room for multiple interpretations of many pieces of it. 24 We have stated our position, our statutory

interpretations in the CMC statement. The government has

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pretty clearly not, and so we don't know exactly which parts they disagree with. But I think it's fair to say they disagree with us on discovery and I think it's fair to say that they disagree with us on their ability to look at the entire record in the case, including the evidence that the plaintiffs have presented.

And I would just as soon get those questions sorted out so that I can then brief you on the actual application of the statute based on a clear understanding of what the statute let's you do and look at.

This isn't a situation where there are kind of small questions of statutory interpretation. These are very big questions. You know, do the plaintiffs -- are the plaintiffs denied their Federal Rule of Civil Procedure rights?

THE COURT: That's true, and it's important to bear in mind that this is not the last stop on the railroad.

MS. COHN: It's true, but then we will end up going up on appeal on questions about whether the Court looked at everything it ought to look at, as opposed to whether the actual decision of the Court was right or not, which I think will result in much greater delay. I would just as soon go up into the Ninth Circuit, where I suspect Mr. Coppolino will take us if you rule in my favor, and I will probably go if you don't, with an actual ruling about the statute itself as opposed to side fights about what's appropriate for the Court

to look at and whether our due process rights were violated as an application of this process, rather than the actual merits of the decision.

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So I think it behooves everybody to get some clarity on the threshold issues before we go into the actual application of the statute.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Miss Cohn.

As persuasive as Miss Cohn has been this morning, and as she usually is, I am, however, not persuaded by her argument that we ought to proceed to address the constitutionality of the statute first. That does seem to me to put the cart before the horse, as I read this statute.

Although, certainly, I cannot say that I have great familiarity with the statute and, indeed, it's a new statute and an unusual one providing for an unusual procedure.

. If the law were more highly developed in this area.

And we knew exactly what this statute contains and how it's applied and how it works and how it's intended to work and so forth, why, I think the plaintiff's arguments about scheduling would make a great deal more sense.

But I do think we need first to see if the statute applies to these cases, to let the government make its presentation in that regard, and to decide that issue as fully as possible, and then decide how the cases are to proceed, if

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at all, thereafter.

So what I would contemplate is a motion by the government and, unless Mr. Coppolino persuades me otherwise or Miss Cohn, I would contemplate essentially the same timing that we have in the Al Haramain case, aiming toward a hearing in early December and I would also contemplate some real limitation on the briefs.

Mr. Berenson mentioned the fact that the telecommunications providers want to weigh in with a lot of briefs. It's foolish for a judge to refuse to accept learning

telecommunications providers want to weigh in with a lot of briefs. It's foolish for a judge to refuse to accept learning from whatever source it comes, but there is a limit on what the Court can or is willing to read. And you can bear in mind that I can always ask for more briefing if there is an issue that I particularly want to hear about. It's been known to happen.

So what I'd really contemplate and appreciate is a motion by the government, in the order of 30 pages, filed on September 30, with opposition by the plaintiffs in October, perhaps the same schedule as in Al Haramain, October 23 -- if the plaintiffs want some more time, that would be fine -- with any reply memorandum by the government on the 13th of November, and a hearing also on December 2nd.

And, Mr. Berenson, can I persuade you to hold your fire and not file any briefing?

MR. BERENSON: Your Honor, may we have a minute or two to consult?

1	THE COURT: Sure.
2	(Discussion held off the record.)
3	MS. COHN: We can wait or I definitely have some
4	THE COURT: You have some problem with that schedule?
5	MS. COHN: I do, your Honor.
6	THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's hold off and see what
7	the caucus on the other side of the courtroom produces.
8	MS. COHN: Can I ask a clarifying question? Or, I
9	guess, we should just wait?
10	THE COURT: Why don't we wait?
11	(Brief pause.)
12	MR. BERENSON: Your Honor?
13	THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Berenson.
14	MR. BERENSON: Your Honor, I think the defendants are
15	probably fine with the schedule that you've laid out, but we do
16	need a bit of clarification on one point.
17	Are you asking the telecom carriers to refrain from
18	filing a brief of their own
19	THE COURT: Yes, yes.
20	MR. BERENSON: on whatever
21	THE COURT: Yes.
22	MR. BERENSON: That I think we might have a problem
23	with, your Honor.
24	Under Section 1802(d) of the statute, Congress
25	specifically provides a role for the parties. It puts the

defendants, the private defendants, on the same footing as the plaintiffs and says each are entitled to submit their views to the Court on any legal issues that arise.

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We would not need to file anything, I suspect, if the plaintiffs' group were not challenging the constitutionality of the statute, but to the extent they come before the Court and tell you that this statutory mechanism which was two years in the making by Congress is defective and cannot be applied, I think the carriers will have some views on that that may not be identical to the government's, but, in any event, would hopefully supplement and flesh them out and we would like an opportunity to make a submission.

THE COURT: Well, under those circumstances, isn't the appropriate course to wait to see what the opposition is that's filed by the plaintiffs? And if the plaintiffs raise issues that are of concern to the telecommunications carriers, then they can file a memorandum and, obviously, the plaintiffs can respond to that memorandum.

How does that sound?

MR. BERENSON: That sounds all right, your Honor. If the plaintiff's representations in the case management statement remain their intentions, I think it's fairly clear that they are going to respond to the government's motion by saying that for somewhere between one and four or five reasons, the FISA Amendments Act, Title II of it, which is the Carrier

Immunity Title, is unconstitutional. 2 So I would expect that we will come before the Court 3 and seek leave to make a filing of our own. We will ask you 4 for a number of pages commensurate with the number of pages 5 that the plaintiffs have devoted to attacking the 6 constitutionality of the statute and can file on that schedule 7 and, certainly, have no objection to the plaintiffs responding 8 to our arguments. 9 THE COURT: Can I count on one brief from all of the telecommunications carriers? 10 11 MR. BERENSON: That you can, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Fine. All right. 13 Miss Cohn has some concern or issue about the schedule. 14 MR. COPPOLINO: Well, let me just make a point about 15 that. This may tie in to what Miss Cohn might have to say. 16 17 We can do it sooner. I mean, I don't think I have 18 ever said that to a Court. I can go sooner than September 19 If you want to get the process started sooner, there is 2.0 no particular reason we would have to take until 21 September 30th. We are quite close to being ready to go. 22 So if your Honor was interested in having our motion 23 in sooner and getting started with that, we could advance this. 24 Otherwise, if not, we could go to with this schedule. 25 So as I understood it, your Honor, it would be our

motion, plaintiff's opposition, our reply and hearing. Just the standard four track. Page limits, local rules. 2 3 And, as I say, if you want us to file sooner than the 4 30th, I think we can -- if it's okay with you, we could do 5 that, but you could also adjust the schedule. 6 THE COURT: Well, in light of the conversation that I 7 just had with Mr. Berenson, perhaps it makes sense to proceed in that fashion, to accelerate the government's filing by some 8 9 number of days. Let's see. Today is the 12th. When do you think you 10 could get your motion on file? 11 MR. COPPOLINO: I think I could get it on file within 12 13 a week, if not sooner. But a week, the 19th, would be acceptable to us. 14 15 THE COURT: All right, the 19th. And then, Ms. Cohn, if we follow that schedule, when 16 17 could you reasonably anticipate being able to file an 18 opposition? MS. COHN: Well, your Honor, I think -- my problem is 19 2.0 not that one. It's what happens once the U.S. and the carriers 21 come in. 22 THE COURT: Well, let's take it one step at a time 23 and maybe we can work these out. Why don't you answer that 24 question that I just posed, and then we will see how that 25 affects the other problems you have in mind?

1	MS. COHN: If our first response is due on
2	October 23rd and they are going to file their motion by
3	September 19th, I think that's probably sufficient time.
4	MR. COPPOLINO: I think the whole schedule should
5	move up, your Honor, because we don't want to lose time in
6	responding to theirs.
7	Theirs is going to be the first brief we have seen
8	with all their opposition arguments. So I would hope that we
9	would have, you know, some adequate time to address them.
10	This schedule gives us 7, 13 20 days. So my idea
11	was to move the schedule up, have a sooner hearing.
12	THE COURT: All right. September 19th for the
13	government's motion. How is October 16th for the plaintiff's
14	opposition?
15	MS. COHN: I think that's still doable. I guess the
16	question I have for you is, is that when we file our cross
17	motion?
18	THE COURT: Your cross motion?
19	MS. COHN: Well, we had envisioned this as a cross
20	motion for declaring the statute unconstitutional.
21	THE COURT: But isn't that really an opposition
22	argument?
23	MS. COHN: It could be framed either way, I think.
24	THE COURT: Okay. Let's
25	MS. COHN: As long as there is sufficient pages, I

don't care whether I file one brief or two. The constitutional arguments are not short. 2 3 THE COURT: Just remember, I can always ask for more 4 pages. 5 MS. COHN: I understand, your Honor, but, 6 unfortunately, Congress has made this statute problematic in 7 not just one way, but a number of ways and we do want to have sufficient space to be able to address them in a reasonable 8 manner. And that leads me to my other concern about this 10 11 briefing schedule, which is, if I understand what Mr. Berenson 12 is suggesting, he is suggesting that in the period that is a reply, not only does the government do a reply brief -- and in 13 this particular instance, remember, their proposal is 50 pages 14 15 for the government and 50 page for them. 16 THE COURT: Well, we haven't -- I haven't agreed to 17 that. 18 MS. COHN: And their proposal for what they are calling the sur reply -- and if we are going to do it that way, 19 2.0 I guess that's the right way. You could think of it that way. 21 We thought of it as a reply brief on our cross motion. I think 22 it's a certain level, six of one, half dozen of another. 23 You know, depending on the size of the briefing that 24 we are going to have to respond to starting on November 13th,

we are going to need -- we are going to need, you know, more

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time and I think that's going to push the hearing date out as well. Because, you know, their proposal -- and, again, I don't 2 3 know if they are going to still stick with it -- is that they 4 file 100 pages and then two weeks later we get 30 pages to 5 respond to their 100 pages and that -- that --6 THE COURT: Forget about these pages. Forget about 7 the pages. Okay. 8 MS. COHN: 9 THE COURT: Nobody is going to get the kind of pages 10 you are talking about. 11 Then, you know, again, you MS. COHN: Okay. understand these things are depending on the size of the 12 13 briefing we have to respond to, the timing that we are going to need to do it --14 15 THE COURT: Hold your horses. Hold your horses. Try this schedule on for size. 16 17 MS. COHN: Okay. THE COURT: Government files its motion on 18 19 September 19th. Plaintiffs' opposition, October 16th. 2.0 government's reply and any telecommunications carrier response 2.1 to the plaintiffs' opposition on November 5th. And then the 22 plaintiffs' response to the telecommunication carriers 23 arguments, November 20. And a hearing December 2nd. 24 MS. COHN: Your Honor, I just want to make sure that 25 I'm following a couple things that I'm clarifying; that you are

taking the position that plaintiffs are not entitled to discovery at this particular point? 2 3 THE COURT: That's correct. 4 MS. COHN: Is there a decision about whether we are 5 entitled to rely on the other evidence in the record in this 6 case, the Klein evidence and the Marcus evidence, or is that --7 THE COURT: It's in the record. It seems to me you 8 can rely upon it. 9 Okay. And we won't be filing a MS. COHN: consolidated complaint for AT&T plaintiffs? 10 11 THE COURT: No. I don't think that's necessary, any 12 more than I think it's necessary to wait for the mandate from 13 the Court of Appeals. I think that's just a ministerial 14 matter. 15 MR. COPPOLINO: I'm sorry, your Honor. Miss Cohn is 16 going to file the Klein material in her opposition? Is that 17 what was just --18 MS. COHN: Well, it's in the record, so I was assuming I would reference it rather than file it, but I 19 2.0 certainly want to have it included as part of what the Court considers here. 2.1 22 MR. COPPOLINO: So I think we are set on the 23 schedule, your Honor, and I think --24 THE COURT: All right. Page limitations. 25 Government's motion will not exceed 30 pages. The plaintiff's

opposition will not exceed 30 pages. The government's reply memorandum will not exceed 15. Telecommunication carrier 2 3 brief, if any, will not exceed 30. And the opposition to the 4 telecommunication carrier's briefing by the plaintiffs will not 5 exceed 20 pages. 6 MS. COHN: Your Honor --7 THE COURT: All right? MS. COHN: Can I ask one more question? 8 9 THE COURT: You may. I hope it's the last one. 10 MS. COHN: In the sur reply papers that you have given us 20 11 12 pages for, I was hoping two things. 13 One is that we could address any issues raised by the 14 government in their reply, as well as issues being raised by 15 the carriers. 16 THE COURT: But that -- that's a sur reply. Your memorandum on the 20th of November should address the 17 telecommunications carrier's position. 18 If there is need for a sur reply because the 19 2.0 government has raised some new issue in its reply that was not 21 raised initially, then you have the ability to ask the Court to 22 file a sur reply, just like in any other case. 23 But a reply memorandum is to address only those 24 matters that are raised in opposition that you didn't have a 25 chance to address in your opening.

1 MS. COHN: Okay. And then --2 THE COURT: Or I guess in this case it would be just 3 the opposite. 4 MS. COHN: It would be the opposite, the things that 5 were raised in the opposition. 6 THE COURT: Right. 7 MS. COHN: The other -- I guess the other request I have -- and I understand your Honor is trying not to do pages, 8 but I would like an equal number of pages to respond to the carriers, rather than a lesser number, since it's their first 10 11 argument. 12 THE COURT: All right. Fair enough. 13 MS. COHN: Okay. 14 MR. BERENSON: Your Honor, I don't want to spend a 15 lot of time arguing about pages --16 THE COURT: You want to reply though. 17 MR. BERENSON: I just want to -- no. I just want to 18 make sure the Court understands that the guts of the briefing, the main issues we'll all be arguing about will really be 19 kicked off by the plaintiff's filing on October the 16th. 2.0 2.1 So the oppositions that come in from the government 22 and from the carriers on November the 15th will essentially be 23 in the nature of an opposition. They will be responding to 24 arguments the plaintiffs have made against application of the 25 statute.

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So that the filing on the 20th by the plaintiffs is basically a reply brief, and it would be quite unorthodox for a reply brief to have -- they will, in effect, have double the number of pages that we will have to address the guts of the issues that are before the Court if they have 30 on reply. That's my only point. MR. COPPOLINO: Your Honor, if I could just add. Again, I really hate to dicker about pages, but as Mr. Berenson points out, that is our first shot at their arguments. Could we at least have the 30 pages? And I can tell you right now our first brief is not going to exceed the local page limit, so we don't need 30 on that. If we could trade off some of that and have 30 for the 5th, we would be -- because that's our first shot at all her constitutional arguments, all her arguments on statutory interpretation, the Klein evidence, discovery, due process, everything. 15 pages hardly seems like enough to deal with all of that. MS. COHN: As long as we are trading, I will take more on opposition in exchange for -- less on response. (Laughter.) THE COURT: Well, all right, Mr. Coppolino. You can have 30 pages on the 5th of November. MS. COHN: Then, your Honor, I would like to have some more pages to present our arguments than just 30. I said

that somewhat facetiously, but we were asking for a 60-page brief. 2 3 There are -- so now at this point -- we were asking 4 for a 60-page brief just on the constitutional and statutory 5 interpretation issues. 6 As a result of your order today, we are not only 7 going to have to brief those, but brief the actual application of the statute here, which is an additional thing. To try to 8 do that in 30 pages, I'm afraid that it's not going to be as helpful to the Court as we would like it to be because we are 10 not going to really be able to address all three things that we 11 need to address here, which is constitutional problems, 12 statutory interpretation problems, and then the application of 13 the statute itself in just 30 pages. 14 15 It's a new statute. It's a case of first impression 16 and there is just a lot. 17 THE COURT: I gather Mr. Coppolino is telling me that he can file his motion within the local rules limitation, which 18 19 I think is 25 pages. 2.0 MR. COPPOLINO: Right. 2.1 That's because it's going to be all under MS. COHN: 22 I want to make sure that those page limits are 23 everything, not just the part that's public. 24 MR. COPPOLINO: No, it's going to be a public 25 submission. Motion, public memorandum of law, not to exceed 25

pages, your Honor. 2 MS. COHN: But the rubber really does meet the road, 3 I think -- I don't often agree with Mr. Berenson, but I think 4 he's right here. 5 The issue isn't the government's initial papers, 6 which I think are fairly straightforward. The issue is, can 7 the statute be applied at all and if so, how? Which really doesn't kick in until we get to speak here. Because the 8 9 government's argument is going to be straightforward. think the statute applies. They don't think there is any 10 problem and they want our cases dismissed. That doesn't take 11 12 very many pages. 13 But to explain why the statute is the problem and, you know, go through the statutory interpretation questions 14 and, obviously, make the argument that there is so much 15 16 interpretation here that -- the Court to do it, I think 30 17 pages is going to -- it's going to be pretty hard for us to lay 18 all that out in that time frame, in the page frame I guess. 19 THE COURT: All right. Well, Miss Cohn, I will give 2.0 you exactly the same number of pages as I'm giving the 21 defendants. You can have 40 pages for your opposition and 45 22 pages for your filing on the 20th of November. 23 MS. COHN: Thank you, your Honor. 24 **THE COURT:** 25 pages for the government. 30, 30, 85

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-- 85 pages on both sides.

1 And counsel should not look pained at that. It's the 2 Court that should look pained at that. 3 All right? Anything further, counsel? 4 MR. WHEATON: Yes, your Honor. If I might be heard, 5 if we are concluded? 6 MS. WHIPPLE: Perhaps I should also ask, your Honor? 7 Peggy Whipple on behalf of Missouri Public Service Commission. Could the order clearly include the single Missouri 8 9 case, which is postured like all the other plaintiff's cases, in which only the telecommunications carriers are the 10 11 defendants? And I'm the plaintiff's counsel. It will not affect 12 this briefing schedule at all. I cooperate fully with these 13 plaintiffs' counsel. I just want to make sure this case is not 14 15 forgotten. 16 MR. COPPOLINO: We do object to that, your Honor. Ιf I could address it? And I think Mr. Berenson may want to 17 address it as well. 18 19 Would you like me to --2.0 THE COURT: I'm not sure I understand what you are 21 saying. 22 MR. COPPOLINO: Miss Whipple represents the State of 23 Missouri, I believe, and her lawsuit is related to other 24 pending lawsuits that the government has brought against 25 various state governments who have sought to investigate the

carriers for alleged intelligence activities.

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The one difference in -- one of the Missouri cases as to which they are plaintiffs is that they, I believe, have sued to enforce requests for information, and that is the Clayton case. In the Clayton case they are a plaintiff seeking the information, a state regulatory body seeking the information.

The United States has also sued the State of
Missouri. So she represents them as a defendant. We have also
sued several other statutes: New Jersey, Vermont and a few
others, Maine, I think Connecticut is in there, too. So those
cases involving state regulatory actions have not been on the
table today. There is a separate provision of this statute,
which by statute preempts those state investigations.

Our view has been, and we have talked with state counsel, including Miss Whipple, that we would separate that issue out for a separate motion track because it concerns separate issues. It concerns whether the Congress can preempt state governments from investigating federal intelligence activities. So they are not part of this schedule.

Now --

THE COURT: And that's the point you were trying to make, Miss Whipple?

MS. WHIPPLE: That is the point I was trying to make.

In the Clayton case as it's currently postured, I represent the plaintiff and the only defendants are six

Missouri AT&T telecommunications carriers.

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Currently this case is more descriptive of the other plaintiff's cases, and we would -- Mr. Coppolino and I have talked, and the one thing that I think we don't disagree on is that there is a fair argument to be raised in this one case only. If it -- if it is appropriately put into either category, it could be argued that it belongs in 802 and not with the other cases that would fall under 803 in which the government is the plaintiff and we are the defendants.

The government is not yet a party in the Clayton case, has had more than two and a half years to intervene, has never chosen to.

And so my request to the Court is to allow this case, which currently fits into the 802 category, to actually remain there. I don't envision any additional briefing or any changes in the schedule. I will cooperate fully with all these plaintiff's counsel. Then whatever this Court rules as to the constitutionality and/or applicability of 802 will necessarily become the law of the case for the Clayton case as well.

Frankly, if the Clayton case is resolved here -- this is the consistent position I have taken before this Court -- the other Missouri case becomes at least moot. It will never need to be reached.

MR. COPPOLINO: Your Honor, the problem is -- and this was not teed up in the case management report because all

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of the other states agreed to take those cases out of this case management proceeding.

And the Clayton case, like all the other state cases, are affected by a different provision of the statute; not the would be that has to do with alleged assistance by telecom carriers through the government, but one that specifically preempts states from investigating the carriers. State governmental authority. It's a completely different issue requiring a completely different set of motions and briefs.

So if you throw Clayton into the mix, whatever argument could be made that 802 applies, 803 certainly applies and we would have to present that.

Now, we could kick that off and start a briefing schedule on that, but none of the other state carrier counsel are here to discuss case management proceedings on that. And, you know, if we have to file a motion to deal with all of the state cases, including Clayton, then that would have to be added to the mix.

And my point simply was that we hadn't presented that to the Court for any case management resolution.

THE COURT: It's certainly a new issue, Miss Whipple.

MS. WHIPPLE: Your Honor, my position would be that the other cases are not at all affected by this. They are so procedurally different from the Clayton case that whatever it is we do here will become the law of the case for Clayton under

802. 1 2 THE COURT: Well, then, what do we have to discuss? 3 MS. WHIPPLE: Well, my worry, your Honor, is that if 4 the Clayton case is not specifically included in this case 5 management order, that when all the government cases are teed 6 up for this Court's consideration and I attempt to argue to the 7 Court that 802 and its processes should be applied to Clayton and not 803, I expect to be met with the argument that I lost 8 my opportunity to present Clayton to the Court under 802 and that those arguments are, therefore, somehow waived. 10 11 You see, the government cannot today assert 803 against the Clayton case. 803 requires the government to 12 13 initiate suit for enforcement. The government is not a party 14 in this case, not yet. And it, by its own choice, has chosen not to be a 15 party; just as, by their own choices, the other state counsel 16 17 who had notice of this hearing have chosen not to come. 18 I come today only with my plaintiff's hat on and only in the Clayton case, which I believe if it belongs anywhere, 19 2.0 belongs in this case management order with the other similarly situated cases. 2.1 22 I'm going to --THE COURT: 23 MR. BERENSON: Your Honor, let me see if I can 24 simplify this. I will try. 25 The government's and the carriers' essential position

is that Clayton is a government case. It's not a private case 2 against the carriers. There are two different provisions under Title II 3 4 that might result in dismissal. 5 One is Section 802, which is the Attorney General 6 certification we have been discussing. 7 The other, Section 803, which is a very clear express preemption provision which basically displaces state authority 8 to investigate, sanction or sue carriers for alleged assistance to the intelligence community. 10 All we are saying is that all of the state cases, 11 including the one out of the six in which the state is 12 13 plaintiff rather than defendant, raise the common legal issues under 803 and ought to be considered together. 14 15 That doesn't mean 802 might not also apply to It might. But if all of the state cases are dealt 16 Clayton. 17 with together, 802 and 803 can be considered in that context. THE COURT: Why isn't the sensible thing to do is to 18 proceed with the issues that we have discussed this morning and 19 2.0 then decide whether any of that has any import as far as the 2.1 Clayton case is concerned? MS. WHIPPLE: Your Honor, I just heard Mr. Berenson 22 23 say, I believe, that he would not attempt to preclude me from 24 arguing the applicability of 802 at some later time. And I am

very relieved to hear that and think that, perhaps, we may have

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just resolved this with the Court. 1 2 THE COURT: If you are relieved, I'm relieved. 3 MR. BERENSON: I can't speak for the government, but 4 we certainly will not attempt to preclude Miss Whipple from 5 making those arguments because 802 is just a second way for 6 Missouri to lose. 7 MR. COPPOLINO: That's right. And you have to look at it in terms of when we seek to -- we sued the State of 8 Missouri, so the idea that we haven't intervened and somehow -we filed a lawsuit, which is a great form of intervention. 10 And so when we -- then the next step would be for the 11 government, as plaintiff in these state cases, to seek summary 12 13 judgment based on the preemption provision and at that point these issues regarding whether Section 802 applies, as well as 14 15 Section 803, would be on the table. If Section 802 applies, the Attorney General 16 17 certifications as to any alleged carrier assistance by AT&T, 18 the certification would have been lodged connection with the carrier cases. 19 2.0 But the question the Court is going to have first is, 21 are they preempted by Section 803, which statutorily does 22 preempt them. And that's the grounds on which we seek summary 23 judgment. 24 So let's just do them separately. That's my only 25 point, your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. Mr. Berenson and Miss Whipple appear to be satisfied with the record as it presently stands, so I'm not going to interfere with that. MS. WHIPPLE: Thank you. MR. BERENSON: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: All right. MR. WHEATON: Your Honor, on behalf of the media alliance and its members, I was asked this morning to appear and if materials are filed under seal under section --Subsection (c), that we would intervene to seek an order such that those materials, if they are sealed, will be sealed pursuant to court orders, not pursuant to a declaration from the Attorney General. Under the statute if the Attorney General files a declaration that the materials would harm national security, then all of the materials submitted to the Court are reviewed in camera. They are automatically sealed without further review by the Court. And, furthermore, the Court's own order dismissing the action has to be sealed and cannot disclose the basis. So we would seek to challenge those, if the Attorney General takes advantage of Subsection (c) and files that declaration. THE COURT: All right.

MR. WHEATON: Having heard this morning, I think --

1	so we don't slow things down, we will wait the filing from the
2	Attorney General's Office and if things are under seal, then we
3	will seek leave to intervene at that point and just use the
4	normal procedures and page limits and all the rest of it.
5	THE COURT: That's fine.
6	MR. COPPOLINO: If Mr. Wheaton is going to move to
7	intervene, we would then oppose. Thank you.
8	MR. WHEATON: The only question I would have, should
9	we set a if we do that, should we set a hearing date
10	MR. COPPOLINO: Why don't we do it on the same
11	schedule?
12	THE COURT: Well, let's wait. You can confer with
13	Mr. Coppolino.
14	MR. WHEATON: I will do that.
15	THE COURT: Obviously, you know what this schedule is
16	and you would have to fold your briefing into this schedule.
17	MR. WHEATON: We'll do that. Again, we are springing
18	this on people today, so we will meet-and-confer. Thank you,
19	your Honor.
20	THE COURT: Very well. Thank you, counsel.
21	MR. KESTER: Your Honor?
22	THE COURT: Mr. Kester?
23	MR. KESTER: I'm sorry, your Honor. 15 seconds for
24	one housekeeping matter, I think is the phrase that's used.
25	I assume I'm correct in thinking that all other

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activities are stayed pending the Court's decision?
              THE COURT: That's correct.
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              MR. KESTER: Thank you, your Honor.
              THE COURT: Very well. Thank you, counsel. We look
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    forward to seeing you in a couple of months.
             (Whereupon, further proceedings in the
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 7
              above matter were adjourned.)
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, DEBRA L. PAS, Official Reporter for the United States Court, Northern District of California, hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings in MDL 06-1791 VRW, IN RE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TELECOMMUNICATIONS RECORDS LITIGATION were reported by me, a certified shorthand reporter, and were thereafter transcribed under my direction into typewriting; that the foregoing is a full, complete and true record of said proceedings as bound by me at the time of filing.

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/s/ Debra L. Pas

Debra L. Pas, CSR 11916, CRR, RMR, RPR
Wednesday, November 5, 2008